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Abstract
This Note addresses the United States’ enactment of the Oil Pollution Act as an alternative
to the Convention of Civil Liability. Part I describes the history of maritime transport and the
development of oil spill liability regulations. Part I also discusses major oil spills and differ-
ent approaches to assessing liability for clean-up. Part II shifts the focus to OPA and the CLC
commentators’ reactions to these legislative schemes. Part II explores critics’ positions on the
effectiveness of OPA and the CLC in handling spill liability. Part III concludes that oil spills are
an international problem. Part III advocates that the United States should become a member of the
CLC so that it can effectively apportion liability for oil spills.
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INTRODUCTION
On February 4, 1999, the New Carissa I ran aground in Coos
Bay, off the coast of Oregon. 2 When the ship ran aground, the
fuel tanks were intact, and held 400,000 gallons of fuel oil.3 The
United States attempted to burn the oil in order to prevent pol-
lution, but the vessel split in half.4 The oil tanks broke and oil
spilled onto the coast.5
The New Carissa leaked as much as 140,000 gallons of fuel
oil and created clean-up costs of over US$35 million.6 When the
U.S. Bureau of Land Management completes an assessment of
the injury to wildlife, it will determine damages.7 Members of
the commercial fishing industry are currently seeking over US$3
million in compensation for their damages.8 The public paid
US$7 million in clean-up costs, which the U.S. Coast Guard guar-
* J.D. Candidate, 2001. I would like to dedicate this Note to my family who have
supported me throughout my educational career and have encouraged me to follow my
dreams. I would like to thank the Editors and Staff of the Journal who worked excep-
tionally hard to help me publish this Note.
1. SeeJohn Griffith, Cargo Ship Beaches near Coos Bay, PORTLAND OREGoNAN, Feb. 5,
1999, at Al (noting that New Carissa is Panamanian flag ship with Filipino crew).
2. See id. (explaining that while New Carissa waited outside harbor for local pilot,
rough weather caused vessel to drift into sand). The New Carissa was a 639-foot-long
trans-Pacific cargo ship bound to dock in Coos Bay to take on cargo. Id.
3. See Nona Brazier, Double Hulls the Best Way To Prevent Oil Spil/ SATrL PoST-
INTELuGENcER, May 27, 1999, at A15 (describing New Carissa as single hulled vessel).
4. See Brent Hunsberger, Insurer Seeks Partial Removal of Carissa's Stern, PORTLAND
OREroNoaN, Feb. 4, 2000 (reporting that U.S. Navy and Coast Guard attempted to bum
oil onboard in effort to remove threat of pollution). Subsequently, the U.S. Navy and
Coastguard towed the bow section into international waters and sank it with gunfire
and torpedoes. Id.
5. See id. (noting that stem section of New Carissa continues to leak oil from single
hull).
6. See id. (noting that due to high clean-up costs, U.S. Coast Guard gave Oregon
authority over beach monitoring and removal of stem).
7. See id. (noting that spill is near nesting area of federally protected western snowy
plovers and foraging area of federally protected marbled murrelet).
8. See id. (establishing that oyster growers were shut out of federal damage assess-
ment by loophole in Oil Pollution Act of 1990 ("OPA')).
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antees to pay back in full.9 In the past decade, however, the fed-
eral government has only reimbursed US$.19 on every dollar of
public spending for clean-up.'
This Note addresses the United State's enactment of the Oil
Pollution Act" (or "OPA") as an alternative to the Convention
of Civil Liability' 2 (or "CLC"). Part I describes the history of
maritime transport and the development of oil spill liability reg-
ulations. Part I also discusses major oil spills and different ap-
proaches to assessing liability for clean-up. Part II shifts the fo-
cus to OPA and the CLC and commentators' reactions to these
legislative schemes. Part II explores critics' positions on the ef-
fectiveness of OPA and the CLC in handling spill liability. Part
III concludes that oil spills are an international problem. Part
III advocates that the United States should become a member of
the CLC so that it can effectively apportion liability for oil spills.
I. UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO
MARITIME OIL SPILLS
Since early times, people have used the ocean for travel and
transportation of goods.'" Maritime commerce increased in
1000 A.D., and generalized sea codes emerged, which ruled until
the 1400s.' 4 During the 1400s, Europe began incorporating
maritime law into national statute law.' 5 The United Kingdom
and the United States first implemented oil pollution regulation
in the 1800s.16 After the Torrey Canyon disaster, several nations
9. Taxpayers Paying for Oil Spills Liability Limits Shield Polluters, NEw ORLEAs TiMEs-
PICAYuNE, Mar. 5, 2000, at Fl.
10. See id. (asserting that only US$4.5 million of US$81.7 million spent by public
was paid back after Exxon Valdez spill).
11. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §2701 (1994).
12. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29,
1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3 [herinafter CLC].
13. See MIcHAE. MARSHALL, OCEAN TRADERS FROM THE PORTUGUESE DISCOVERIES TO
THE PRESENT DAY 12 (1990) (noting that monks, merchants, and Vikings all traveled by
sea before Age of Discovery).
14. See NICHOLAS J. HEALY & DAVID J. SHARPE, CASES & MATERIALS ON ADMIRALTY 2
(3d ed. 1999) (providing that sea laws in compilations of various degrees of authority
were primary sources of law).
15. See id. (establishing that English maritime law remained decisional and Europe
incorporated maritime law into statute).
16. SeeJoseph C. Sweeney, Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 37 FoRDAm L. REV. 155, 155
(1968) (describing legislation prohibiting deposit of refuse into navigable waters).
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met to allocate international liability law for oil spills. 7 The
United States participated in the CLC, but declined to join.'"
The United States did not have a comprehensive oil spill liability
scheme until it enacted OPA, after the Exxon Valdez oil spill.19
A. Maritime Oil Transport
As technology advanced, sea travel became an integral part
of society, increasing the need for maritime regulation. 20 From
as early as 300 B.C., ancient laws held shipowners liable for dam-
age to the property of others.2' Under traditional maritime law,
shipowners were able to limit their liability in order to prevent
responsibility for acts beyond their control.22 Maritime nations
were forced to evaluate liability laws after major spills, such as
the Torrey Canyon.3
1. History of Maritime Transport Liability
Maritime scholars approximate that ocean travel for the
transport and trade of goods began as early as 3100 B.C.24 As a
trading industry evolved, maritime societies constructed rules. 5
17. See HEALY & SHARI'E, supra note 14, at 876 (asserting that Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization ("IMCO") met in November 1969 to restate law of
liability for oil spills).
18. See Wu CHAO, POLLUTION FROM THE CARRIAGE OF OIL BY SEA: LIABILITY AND
COMPENSATION 221 (1996) (noting that United States declined to join Convention on
Civil Liability ("CLC") because CLC failed to provide for unlimited liability).
19. See Tyler J. Savage, North American Oil Pollution: Who Is Liable for a Canadian
American Catastrophe?, 4 ROGER WnIuLueS U. L. REv. 335, 346 (1998) (asserting that Ex-
xon Valdez was catalyst in U.S. decision to enact federal law).
20. SeeJoANN.-A BURGER, OIL SPILLS 19 (1997) (noting increase in production of oil
correlated with increase in maritime laws regulating transport).
21. See BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, § 2 1-5 (M. Cohen 7th ed. 1982) (noting that Rho-
dian Sea Law held shipowners liable for loss of jettisoned cargo); see also HEALY &
SHARPE, supra note 14, at 760 (describing law of general average, which apportioned
loss).
22. HEALY & SIHARPE, supra note 14, at 817.
23. See CHAO, supra note 18, at 9 (noting Torrey Canyon's significance in terms of
size and effect).
24. See MARsHALL, supra note 13, at 12 (stating that during first dynasty, Egyptians
constructed ships to transport cedar from Lebanon forests); see also BENEDICT, supra
note 21, § 2 1-5 (finding that by Middle Kingdom, circa, 2133-1603 B.C., Egyptians used
vessels 150 feet long with crews of up to 120 sailors).
25. See BENEDICT, supra note 21, § 1 1-5 (stating that as early as 900 B.C., Phe-
onician and Rhodian civilizations had formed and began to develop primitive legal
systems); see also MARsHALL., supra note 13, at 12 (discussing Roman Empire's develop-
ment of first efficient maritime legal system between 200 and 160 B.C.).
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While few specific details are known about the laws and customs
of the ancient seamen,26 laws governing ships on the seas date
back as far back as 1600 B.C.
2 7
Commentators maintain that even during early civilization,
jettison was a common practice among sea-farers to rescue
their vessels from jeopardy.29 Legal experts note that under
Rhodian law,30 seamen were subject to liability for the loss of
jettisoned cargo.-" There is little evidence, however, of laws gov-
erning liability for damage to the marine environment caused by
cargo released into the sea.3 2
In 1814, the United Kingdom enacted water pollution legis-
lation, becoming the first nation to address water pollution.3 In
1866, the United States prohibited all discharge in New York
Harbor. 4 The United States expanded the prohibition to in-
clude all navigable waters in 1899.11 Since then, nations
throughout the world have addressed oil spill liability both do-
mestically and internationally.1
6
26. See BENEDiCr, supra note 21, § 2 1-6 (arguing that while laws may have been
important to sea-farers, they lacked general public's interest).
27. See id. § 2 1-3 (explaining that sea laws from Ancient Babylon-which discusses
proper procedures for loss of cargo or ship-are estimated to date from between 2000
and 1600 B.C.).
28. See HEALY & SHAME, supra note 14, at 1 (definingjettison as shipmaster's right
to throw cargo overboard to save ship and other cargo).
29. See WALTER ASHBURNER, THE RHODLAN SEA LAw (1909), quoted in BENEDiaT,
supra note 21, § 3 1-13 (noting that early laws held that duringjettison, there should be
voting among passengers to determine what should be done); HEALY & SHA"E, supra
note 14, at 760.
30. See ASHBURNER, supra note 29 (noting that maritime customs and practices of
ancient Rhodes became framework for maritime laws of other cultures).
31. See HEALY & SHARPE, supra note 14, at 760 (noting that law of general average is
oldest doctrine of maritime law referred to in written records). General average pro-
vides that because jettisoned merchandise was thrown overboard for benefit of all, the
loss should, and must, be made by contribution of all. Id.
32. See ASHBURNER, supra note 29 (proposing that there was little concern for oil
pollution damage because oil was not yet used for fuel and not yet transported across
oceans in mass quantities).
33. See Sweeney, supra note 16, at 155 (noting that U.K. legislation prohibited dis-
charge of rubbish or filth into any navigable river, harbor, or haven).
34. See Refuse Act of 1886, ch. 929, § 3, 24 Stat. 329 (1886) (making it unlawful to
dump any waste, whatsoever, into New York City Harbor).
35. Refuse Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 16, 20 Stat. 1152 (1899) (to be codified at 33
U.S.C. § 407). This Refuse Act exacted compliance by imposing fines and imprison-
ment. Id.
36. See C-Ao, supra note 18, at 2 (describing provisions of international and U.S.
law for oil spills); A.H.E. Popp, Q.C., A North American Perspective on Liability and Compen-
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2. Development of Maritime Oil Transport
Scholars conclude that as technology advanced, the de-
mand for oil rose drastically.8 7 The additional ships needed to
fulfill the growing demand for oil increased the possibility of a
maritime accident and underscored the need for protective reg-
ulation."' In response, the United States passed the Oil Pollu-
tion Act of 1924,"9 making it illegal to dump oil-carried as fuel
or cargo-into U.S. coastal waters.4' In 1948, the United States
passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, granting Con-
gress the power to control states' rights concerning legislation of
water pollution.41 Although laws addressing water pollution
were in effect for decades, statutory efforts to control the effects
of maritime environmental damage only began in 1966.42
Currently, oil accounts for nearly forty percent of the
world's consumption of energy.48 The majority of known oil
reserves are found within member countries of the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC"); oil is transported
from these countries by oil tankers in mass quantities on a daily
basis.' Many scholars concede that it is inevitable that some of
this oil will be spilled.45
sation for Oil Pollution Caused by Ships, in LiABiUTy FOR DAMAGE TO THE MARINE ENVIRON-
MENT 109 (Colin M. De La Rue ed., 1993) (describing formulation of U.S. and Cana-
dian liability laws).
37. See BURGER, supra note 20, at 19 (noting that little use was made of petroleum
until invention of gasoline engine, when use for automobiles, trucks, tractors, and air-
planes increased demand for oil); Sweeney, supra note 16, at 155 (noting move in mari-
time industry from sail to coal to oil).
38. See BURGER, supra note 20, at 19 (suggesting that increase in number of ships
was due to imbalance between consumption and production in most areas).
39. Oil Pollution Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 604 (1924) (repealed by The Water Quality
Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 81 Stat. 91, 84 Stat. 1161 (1970)).
40. See id. (instituting fine of US$500 to US$2500 and imprisonment for 30 days to
one year if oil was discharged into coastal waters); see also HEALY & SHA"'E, supra note
14, at 867 (stating that in this early act there was no concern for prevention or cleanup
of spills and penalties were solely criminal).
41. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 62 Stat. 1161 (1948).
42. See HEALY & SHARPE, supra note 14, at 869 (noting that Clean Water Restoration
Acts required polluting shipowner to either clean-up himself or reimburse United
States for clean-up expenses).
43. See BURGER, supra note 20, at 19 (describing rise in world oil consumption from
53,000 to 60,000 barrels per day since early 1980s).
44. Id.
45. See id. at 26 (noting that between 20 and 340 million gallons of oil are spilled
into oceans each year); see also PERCIVAL, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND Poucy 138 (2d ed. 1996) (eiplaining that more than 6000 oil spills occur
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3. Traditional Maritime Liability Doctrines and
Oil Spill Regulation
In 1851, after a US$22,224 judgment against a shipowner,46
the U.S. Congress passed the Act of 1851,' 7 which created the
defense of limited liability.48 Prior to the Act of 1851, the doc-
trine of respondeat superior applied when a ship's crew navi-
gated negligently and harmed the plaintiffs cargo.49 While the
Act of 1851 did not remove the doctrine of respondeat superior,
it did set a ceiling on damages recoverable from a shipowner
under vicarious liability for the conduct of employees.5"
Traditional maritime law allowed limited liability for three
types of losses-loss of cargo, collision damage liability, and per-
sonal injury or death claims.5 Recently, the U.S. Congress ad-
ded to the scope of limited liability: clean-up costs, environmen-
tal harm and economic damage arising from oil pollution in
coastal waters. 52 Limited liability is available as an affirmative de-
fense to any claim that falls under admiralty jurisdiction.5"
Catastrophic oil spills are the crux of the legislation regulat-
ing oil pollution both domestically and internationally.54 Since
the 1960s, notorious maritime accidents caused devastating envi-
every year-making total amount in some years equal to amount of oil spilled in Exxon
Valdez spill); Sweeney, supra note 16, at 156 (stating that there are certain expectable
and inconsequential risks in loading and discharging oil); Capt. S. Pullat, An Overview of
Pollution Compensation Claims, Busn'mss Lrm, Mar. 3, 1997 (noting that as oil activity
increases, so does potential for pollution).
46. See NewJersey Steam Nay. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 47 U.S. 344 (1848) (holding
corporate owner liable for gross negligence with respect to construction, equipment,
and loading of vessel).
47. Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 43, 9 Stat. 635 (1851).
48. Id.; see HEALY & SHARPE, supra note 14, at 814 (noting that Congress' response
was due in large part to reaction of shipowners to case).
49. See HEALY & SHARPE, supra note 14, at 813 (asserting that only negligent actions
could be tried in personam, all others were tried in rem).
50. Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 43, 9 Stat. 635 (1851).
51. See HEALY & SHARPE, supra note 14, at 817 (explaining history of limitation of
liability as applied to damages).
52. See id. at 818 (describing environmental claims as most recent, largest, and
most difficult claims to insure adequately).
53. Id. at 819.
54. See Steven T. Smith, An Analysis of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the 1984
Protocols on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 14 Hous.J. ITr'L L. 115, 117 (1991)
(describing impact of major spills such as Torrey Canyon, Amoco Cadiz, and Exxon
Valdez on regulation of oil transport); Emmanuel Fontaine, The French Experience:
"Tanio" and "Amoco Cadiz" Incidents Compared, in LIABILrTY FOR DAMAGE TO THE MARINE
ENVIRONMENT 101 (Colin M. De La Rue ed., 1993); Christopher B. Kende, The United
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ronmental damage." Oil tankers that are synonymous with envi-
ronmental destruction include the Torrey Canyon,56 the Amoco
Cadiz,57 the Tanio,58 the Exxon Valdez,59 and most recently the
Braer.60 After each of these spills, injured parties sought com-
pensation for losses and expenses.6' When assessing liability,
world governments faced the task of evaluating the liability laws
to determine how they could be improved.62
4. Maritime Oil Spills: The Torrey Canyon
The Torrey Canyon was a super-tanker transporting oil from
Kuwait to Milford Haven, Wales.65 On March 18, 1967, the ship
ran aground, spilling 10,000 tons of crude oil into the English
Channel and damaging both the English and French coast-
lines.64 This was the first highly publicized maritime disaster; it
States Approach, in LIjAtirv FOR DAMAGE TO THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 131 (Colin M. De
La Rue ed., 1993).
55. See BURGER, supra note 20, at 35 (charting locations of major oil spills in waters
of France, United Kingdom, and United States).
56. See HEALx & SHAMPE, supra note 14, at 871 (explaining that Torrey Canyon
spilled 100,000 tons of oil into English Channel). The Torrey Canyon was the first
major maritime oil spill and brought about international awareness of the potential
catastrophic effects of oil transport. Id.
57. See In the Matter of Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of France on
March 16, 1978, 954 F.2d 1279, 1285 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that Amoco Cadiz spilled
68 million gallons of oil, damaging approximately 180 miles of French coastline).
58. See Fontaine, supra note 54, at 105 (describing March 7, 1980, when Tanio
broke in half in heavy weather conditions, spilling more than 13,500 tons of oil off coast
of Brittany, polluting more than 200 kilometers of coast).
59. SeeJohn Gallagher, In the Wake of Exxon Valdez" Murhey Legal Waters of Liability
and Compensation, 25 NEw ENG. L. REv. 571, 571 (1990) (asserting that in 1989, Exxon
Valdez went aground on Bligh Reef spilling over 11 million gallons of oil into Alaskan
waters).
60. See Paul S. Edehman, Issues in the Wake of Recent Oil Spills, N.Y.LJ., Mar. 5, 1993,
at 3. (noting that Braer ran aground on Jan. 5, 1993, off Shetland Islands, spilling
600,000 barrels of oil in North Sea).
61. See Smith, supra note 54, at 115 (asserting that these disasters changed world
view of oil transport).
62. See CHAo, supra note 18, at 2 (discussing influence of Torrey Canyon on crea-
tion of international oil spill liability regime, questioning fairness of regime after
Amoco Cadiz, and U.S. radical stance after Exxon Valdez).
63. See BURGER, supra note 20, at 35 (noting Torrey Canyon was 118,285-ton vessel
carrying oil from Kuwait when it hit rocks in Scilly Isles, causing world's first publicized
oil spill catastrophe).
64. See Huge Tanker in Danger on Rocks off Britain, N.Y. Tms, Mar. 19, 1967, at 79
(noting primary reason for Torrey Canyon collision was captain's bad judgment).
There was pressure to beat the tide, and the ship's master made a decision to steer
between the Seven Stones and the main islands. Id.
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brought about awareness of pollution dangers.6"
The oil reached the United Kingdom first, which was unpre-
pared to deal with the pollution.66 In an attempt to salvage some
of the vessel, the English set fire to the crude oil in both the hull
and on the surface of the ocean.67 After bombing the ship, the
United Kingdom used detergents to emulsify and disperse the
oil. 68
Eventually, the oil reached the French shores.69 France re-
sponded by spilling chalk into the waters, which bound the oil
into particles that sank to the bottom of the ocean.' ° Although
France was more successful in handling the spill than the United
Kingdom, long term environmental damage still occurred to
both coastlines.7'
Due to the lack of clear liability regulations, the compensa-
tion claims after the Torrey Canyon proved difficult to adjudi-
cate.72 Initially, a judge approved an ex parte order, enjoining
the prosecution of all independent action, and proceedings in
the United States, and approving a stipulation valuing the inter-
est of the responsible parties at US$50, the worth of the vessel
65. See Wang Mao Shen et al., The Normal Procedure of Assessment of Damage to the
Marine Environment in Chinese Judicial Practice, in LIABILr- FOR DAMAGE TO THE MARINE
ENVIRON ENT (Colin M. De La Rue ed., 1993) (asserting that Torrey Canyon was widely
reported and people began to realize possibilities of disaster that came with oil spills).
66. See BURGER, supra note 20, at 35 (noting that government waited 10 days before
taking any action). When the U.K. Government finally responded, the Royal Air Force
attempted to bum the oil remaining in the tanker by aerial bombardment. Id.
67. See id. at 36 (describing flames shooting 200 to 300 feet in air, smoke rising
miles up and out, and soot dropping on English Channel).
68. See id. (noting that two million gallons of detergents were used to treat land
while another half million gallons were sprayed at sea). The detergent spraying was an
attempt to save the Cornish beaches, which are Britain's main holiday area. Id. In
hindsight, the emulsification proved to be more damaging to the wildlife than the oil
itself was, which brought attention to the how unprepared the world was to deal with a
major oil catastrophe. Id. The spill had an extremely damaging effect on diving birds
in the area, but seemingly did not have any permanent affects on the fisheries,
shellfisheries, or the seals. Id.
69. See id. (asserting that French had longer to prepare for spill).
70. See id. (noting that French convened international team of scientists to deter-
mine how to approach spill). They decided to use chalk. Id. The chalk was not as
harmful to the environment as the detergents used by the English. Id.
71. Id.
72. See HEALY & S ,ARPE, supra note 14, at 875 (discussing conflict between ship-
owners and government in determining liability for Torrey Canyon and lack of clarity in
statutes).
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after the aerial bombing.7 3 The Torrey Canyon disaster made
apparent the need for oil spill liability laws. 4
The 1967 spill brought about the realization of the potential
damage of oil tankers. 5 Many commentators argue that the
1969 CLC was a direct reaction to the Torrey Canyon's impact
on the French and U.K. coastlines and the inability to assign lia-
bility for damages.76 The CLC and the International Oil Pollu-
tion Compensation Fund ("IOPC") were the proposed solutions
should a similar disaster occur.7 7
B. International Regulation: The Convention on Civil Liability
The first attempt at unifying maritime law for liability for oil
spills was the 1924 Convention on the Limitation of Shipowners'
Liability' ("1924 Convention").7 9 In 1954, the Intergovernmen-
tal Maritime Consultative Organization ("IMCO") implemented
the 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollu-
tion of the Sea by Oil 0 ("OILPOL"). s' After the 1967 Torrey
Canyon spill, the need for better liability laws became appar-
73. See In the Matter of the Complaint of Barracude Tanker Corp. as the Owner of
the S/T Torrey Canyon and the Union Oil Company of California for the Exoneration
from the Limitation of Liability, 281 F. Supp. 228, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (explaining that
due to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, liability was limited to stipulated vessel); see also
HE.LY & SHARPE, supra note 14, at 813 (noting that traditional maritime law set value of
ship as ceiling on recoverable damages).
74. See HEALY & SHARPE, supra note 14, at 876 (noting that soon after Torrey Can-
yon settlement, British Government asked Intergovernmental Consultative Organiza-
tion ("ICO") to consider conventions); see also CHAo, supra note 18, at 9 (describing
Torrey Canyon as benchmark in history of liability legislation).
75. See Shen, supra note 65, at 29 (arguing that until 1967, oil pollution from ships
attracted little attention in legal community, and since then, has been subject of in-
creasing attention internationally).
76. See CiAo, supra note 18, at 38 (noting that preparatory work and conference
discussions must be reviewed to understand true intent of CLC); Beth Van Hanswyck,
The 1984 Protocols to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damages
and the International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damages: An Option for Needed
Reform in United States Law, 22 INT'L LAw. 319, 321 (1988) (describing inadequacy of
maritime legal principals in resolving compensation claims and liability issues raised by
claimants after Torrey Canyon spill).
77. CLC, supra note 12.
78. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the
Limitation of Liability of Owners of Sea-Going Vessels, August 24, 1924 120 L.N.T.S.,
reprinted in 6 BENEDICr, supra note 21, § 5 2-10.
79. Id.
80. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil
1954, May 12, 1954, 327 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter OILPOL].
81. Id.
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ent.12 In 1969, several nations met for the CLC to restate liabil-
ity.8 3 The CLC was amended in 1984 and 1992 in an attempt to
create an improved compensation system for those injured by oil
spills.8 4
1. Background
In 1924, maritime nations met to discuss the unification of
maritime law concerning civil liability for oil pollution from
tankers.85 The 1924 Convention was the first international at-
tempt at limiting shipowners' liability.8 6 Commentators argue
that because major shipping nations did not adopt the 1924
Convention, it had little actual effect on the maritime industry.
8 7
In 1948, the IMCO became a powerful force in intema-
tional oil pollution law.8" In 1954, the IMCO realized that it was
necessary to take both initial precautions to insure that a spill
did not occur and to assign liability after a spill happened.' In-
ternational oil pollution regulation came into effect with
OILPOL, prohibiting oil tankers from indiscriminate dump-
ing.9°
82. See Van Hanswyck, supra note 76, at 321 (noting difficulty in resolving numer-
ous compensation claims and liability issues raised by claimants after Torrey Canyon).
83. CLC, supra note 77.
84. See Magnus G6ransson, The 1984 and 1992 Protocol to the Civil Liability Conven-
tion, 1969 and the Fund Convention, 1971, in LiAuLrrv FOR DAMAGE TO THE MARINE ENvi.
RONmENT 72 (Colin M. De La Rue ed., 1993) (asserting that factors for revision in-
cluded inflation and oil spills).
85. See CHAo, supra note 18, at 33 (describing first international convention apply-
ing limited liability, entered into force in 1931).
86. Id. at 33.
87. See id. (arguing that because Belgium, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Hungary,
Madagascar, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey were only parties, therefore 1924
Convention on the Limitation of Shipowners' Liability ("1924 Convention") had little
effect on shipping industry); see also Donald C. Greenman, Limitation on Liability: A
Critical Analysis of United States Law in an International Setting 57 TuL. L. Rxv. 1139, 1142
(1983) (noting that whether they joined, many shipowners would be subject to U.S.
jurisdiction).
88. Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization,
Mar. 6, 1948, 289 U.N.T.S. 48. The name of the IMCO was changed to International
Maritime Organization ("IMO") by the 1975 Protocol that entered into force in 1984.
Id.
89. See HEALY & SHmPE, supra note 14, at 870 (describing attempt at making dis-
charge of oil or oily mixtures into sea in certain prohibited zones illegal).
90. See CHAO, supra note 18, at 1 (noting that International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil ("OILPOL") was later revised to prohibit spill
of oil generally, instead ofjust in certain areas).
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In 1967, OILPOL proved ineffective, forcing major shipping
nations9 ' to promulgate new liability laws.92 In 1969, the IMCO
met and created the CLC to restate the law of liability for oil
spills.9" The current international oil pollution liability laws de-
scend from this conference. 9
4
The CLC's objectives are twofold: to guarantee adequate
compensation for those injured by oil spills and to provide uni-
form rules regarding clean-up procedures and liability for pollu-
tion.95 Since 1969, the CLC has been amended twice, with 107
nations ratifying it.96 The 1984 Protocol was never adopted.97
The 1992 Protocol came into effect in 1996.98
2. Provisions of the CLC
The CLC imposes strict liability and compulsory liability in-
surance on shipowners.99 After a spill, aggrieved parties file
91. See CLC, supra note 12 (listing participants as governments of Cameroon, Re-
public of China, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Guatemala, Iceland, Indonesia,
Italy, Korea, Malagasy Republic, Monaco, Poland, Switzerland, United Kingdom,
United States, and Yugoslavia).
92. See HELY & SHARPE, supra note 14, at 875 (noting that conventions and statutes
resulting after Torrey Canyon were compromises between government interests and
interests of shipowners and insurers); see also Fontaine, supra note 54, at 101 (asserting
that CLC established strict liability-based compensation mechanism for pollution dam-
age immediately after Torrey Canyon spill); Smith, supra note 54, at 117 (describing
IMCO sponsored international conference as attempt to re-examine current interna-
tional laws).
93. See CHAO, supra note 18, at 38 (naming CLC objectives as guaranteeing ade-
quate compensation and providing uniform rules).
94. See BENErcr, supra note 21, Doc. 6-4B (noting that 1992 Protocols were signed
December 2, 1992 and entered into force May 30, 1996).
95. CLC, supra note 12. The preamble states:
CONVINCED of the need to ensure that adequate compensation is available
to persons who suffer damage caused by pollution resulting from the escape
or discharge of oil from ships,
DESIRING to adopt uniform international rules and procedures for determin-
ing questions of liability and providing adequate compensation in such cases.
Id.
96. See CMI YEARBOOK 459 (1997) (listing member Nations of CLC and 1992 Proto-
cols and describing conditions of ratification).
97. See G6ransson, supra note 84, at 75 (noting that entry into force for 1984 Proto-
cols was dependent on ratification of minimum number of 10 states, including no less
than six with minimum tonnage of one million tons). The author argues that many
states were prepared to become parties to the Protocols, but were anticipating U.S.
actions. Id.
98. CMI YEARBOOK, supra note 96, at 459.
99. See Prof. A. Kolodkin, et. al, Some New Trends in Legislation of the Russian Federa-
tion and Its Attitude Towards Conventions with Regard to Marine Pollution, in LiABiLrr FOR
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claims against a pre-established fund.1°° If the amount recov-
ered under the CLC is insufficient, then recovery is available
from the IOPC 10 '
The adoption of strict liability is one of the most important
elements of the CLC.10 2 Scholars agree that another fundamen-
tal element is the IOPC. 03 This fund enables shipping and oil
industries to share the burden of liability for an oil spill.104
Unless there are certain exonerating circumstances, the
CLC adopts strict liability for the shipowner.10 5 The CLC aban-
dons the traditional concept of liability based on fault.'06 Legal
DAMAGE TO THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 40 (Colin M. De La Rue ed., 1993) (commenting
that strict liability, higher limits of liability, compulsory insurance, and right of direct
action against insurer have contributed to improvement of position of those injured by
oil pollution).
100. See id. (noting that fund must be established by shipowner before ship can sail
in international waters).
101. See HEALY & SHARE, supra note 14, at 877 (commenting that International Oil
Pollution Compensation Fund ("IOPC") was created in 1971 and financed by tax on oil
imports).
102. See MfnsJacobsson, The International Conventions on Liability and Compensation
for Oil Pollution Damage and the Activities of the International Oil Pollution Compensation
Fund, in LIABILrn' FOR DAMAGE TO THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 40 (Colin De La Rue ed.,
1993) (explaining that owners of vessels are liable for pollution simply for being owners
of oil polluting vessels).
103. See Smith, supra note 54, at 117 (arguing that with strict liability and IOPC
available when spill occurs, international community is now able to redress quickly oil
pollution problems); R~mond-Gouilloud, The Future of the Compensation System as Estab-
lished by the International Convention, in inaiLr" FOR DAMAGE TO THE MARINE ENVIRON-
mENT 85 (Colin De La Rue, ed., 1993) (asserting that key feature of system lies in appor-
tionment of financial burden between oil transport industry, oil refiners, and traders).
The risk-creators are able to bear the consequences if there is an oil spill; which truly
respects the idea of a polluter pays principal. Ramond-Gouilloud, supra.
104. See R~mond-Gouilloud, supra note 103 (arguing that key feature of system is
apportionment of liability).
105. CLC, supra note 12. Article 111(2) states:
No liability for oil pollution damage shall attach to the owner if he proves that
the damage:
(a) resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a natural
phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character, or
(b) was wholly caused by an act or omission done with intent to cause damage
by a third party, or
(c) was wholly caused by negligence or other wrongful act of any government
or other authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or other navi-
gational aids in the exercise of that function.
Id.
106. See HEALY & SHAm'E supra note 14, at 813 (describing fault-based rule of liabil-
ity- persons are liable to pay damages, up to full extent of their assets, for their own
negligence, for their own intentional torts, and for breaching their contracts); see also
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scholars assert that if these circumstances only partially or inci-
dentally cause an accident, then strict liability still will apply.1"7
When traveling in CLC member waters, a shipowner carry-
ing more than 2000 tons of oil is required to maintain insurance
or other financial security.'08 This security ensures if there is a
spill, then the polluter has the financial ability to pay for dam-
ages caused by the spill.10 9 Under the CLC, compensation is
available for the costs of preventing contamination and damage
caused by contamination. 110 Commentators assert that the
CLC's limited definition of damages avoids the possibility of over
compensation."' The GLC awards money only for quantifiable
damages." 12
Jacobsson, supra note 102, at 41 (noting that replacing fault liability by strict liability was
revolutionary in 1969).
107. See CHAo, supra note 18, at 60 (commenting that "wholly" is clear to define in
sections (b) and (c), but (a) is difficult). The author describes four types of causation:
parallel, complementary, cumulative, and exclusive. Id.; Cynthia M. Wilkinson, et al.,
Slick Work. An Analysis of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 12 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES &
ENvrL. L 181, 185 (1992).
108. CLC, supra note 12. Article VII states:
The owner of a ship registered in a Contracting State and carrying more than
2000 tons of oil in bulk as cargo shall be required to maintain insurance or
other financial security, such as the guarantee of a bank or a certificate deliv-
ered by an international compensation fund, in the sums fixed by applying the
limits of liability prescribed in Article V, paragraph 1 to cover his liability for
pollution damage under this Convention.
Id.
109. See CHAo, supra note 18, at 67 (remarking that strict liability would be worth-
less in case of pollution caused by insolvent shipowners because injured parties would
be without compensation).
110. Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage. [hereinafter 1992 Protocol]. Article 2.3 reads:
Paragraph 6 is replaced by the following text:
Pollution damage means:
(a) loss or damage caused outside the ship by contamination resulting
from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship, wherever such es-
cape or discharge may occur, provided that compensation for impair-
ment of the environment other than loss of profit from such impair-
ment shall be limited to the costs of reasonable measures of reinstate-
ment actually undertaken or to be undertaken;
(b) the costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage caused
by preventive measures.
Id.
111. See Rimond-Gouilloud, supra note 103, at 92 (asserting that only measures
actually undertaken or to be undertaken will be taken into account in determining
damages); see also CHAo, supra note 18, at 47 (noting that CLC, refuses compensation in
cases of explosion or fire resulting from oil spill or in cases of intentional discharge).
112. 1992 Protocol, supra note 110, at art. 2.3.
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The CLC limits liability to the shipowner.' The signatories
agreed to this limited definition because, by financing the IOPC,
cargo owners and operators are still held to a level of responsibil-
ity.' 14 Critics commend the CLC's definition of responsible
party, because it enables prompt and efficient compensation."15
Article III limits the liability of the shipowner. '1 6 A ship-
owner can never be liable for more than a pre-determined
amount, regardless of fault. 17 Article IV expressly assures that
claims will not be brought against servants or agents of the
owner.
118
113. CLC, supra note 12. Article I defines shipowner as:
the person or persons registered as the owner of the ship or, in the absence of
registration, the person or persons owning the ship. However, in the case of a
ship owned by a state and operated by a company which in that state is regis-
tered as the ship's operator, owner shall mean such company.
Id.
114. SeeJacobsson, supra note 102, at 46 (noting thatJapanese oil industry contrib-
utes about 29% of IOPC); see also CHAo, supra note 18, at 96 (providing that if amount
of oil received exceeds 150,000 tons, then person shall pay contributions).
115. See CHAo, supra note 18, at 55 (arguing that in order to insure prompt com-
pensation, solution based on administrative evidence is favored). The author cites the
Torrey Canyon as an example of where the real owner and the apparent owner were
difficult to distinguish. Id.; see also Fontaine, supra note 54, at 106 (arguing that IOPC
and victims were able to start prompt recovery actions against responsible parties). But
see R~mond-Gouilloud, supra note 103, at 95 (arguing that Amoco Cadiz incident
showed that CLC actually increased risk for some persons).
116. CLC, supra note 12. Article 111.4 states: "No claim for compensation for pol-
lution damage shall be made against the owner otherwise than in accordance with this
Convention. No claim for pollution damage under this Convention or otherwise may
be made against the servants or agents of the owner." Id.
117. See CHAo, supra note 18, at 56 (noting that CLO does not employ unlimited
liability for shipowners unless act was purposeful or reckless); see also Robert 0. Phillips
Charterer's Point of View, in LIaBILrrY FOR DAMAGE TO THE MARINE ENV-RoNMENT 159
(Colin M. De La Rue ed., 1993) (arguing that owners should be allowed to limit liability
so long as limits are reasonable).
118. 1992 Protocol, supra note 110. Article 4 states:
Subject to paragraph 5 of this Article, no claim for compensation for pollution
damage under this Convention or otherwise may be made against:
(a) the servants or agents of the owner or the members of the crew,
(b) the pilot or any other person who, without being a member of the crew,
performs services for the ship;
(c) any charterer, manager or operator of the ship;
(d) any person performing salvage operations with the consent of the owner
or on the instructions of a competent public authority;
(e) any persons taking preventive measures;
(f) all servants or agents of persons mentioned in subparagraphs (c), (d), and
(e);
unless the damage resulted from their personal act or omission, committed
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Liability of a shipowner is limited based on the size of the
vessel." 9 The 1992 Protocols expanded liability so that the ship-
owner of a vessel weighing less than 5000 tons would be liable
for 3 million Special Drawing Rights. 12 0 The Protocols increased
maximum liability limitations from US$87million to US$196 mil-
lion.12
The 1969 CLC attempted to provide uniform rules regard-
ing the clean-up of spills.' 22 The CLG and the IOPC preempt
any nation's laws regarding oil pollution. 23 The CLC also super-
sedes any other international conventions.
24
The 1992 Protocols expand the geographic range of the
with the intent to cause such result, or recklessly and with knowledge that such
damage would probably result.
119. CLC, supra note 12. Article V states: "The owner of a ship shall be entitled to
limit his liability under this Convention in respect to any one incident to an aggregate
amount of 2000 francs for each ton of the ship's tonnage. However, this aggregate
amount shall not in any event exceed 210 million francs." Id&
120. 1992 Protocol, supra note 110. Article 6.1 reads:
(1) The owner of a ship shall be entitled to limit his liability under this Con-
vention in respect to any one incident to an aggregate the amount calcu-
lated as follows:
(a) 3 million units of account for a ship not exceeding 5000 units of ton-
nage; for a ship with tonnage in excess thereof, for each additional
unit of tonnage, 420 units of account in addition to the amount men-
tioned in subparagraph (1); provided, however, that this aggregate
amount shall not in any event exceed 59.7 million units of account.
Id.; Article 6.4 states:
The "unit of account" referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article is the Special
Drawing Right as defined by the International Monetary Fund. The amounts
mentioned in paragraph 1 shall be converted into national currency on the
basis of the value of that currency by reference to the Special Drawing Right
on the date of the constitution of the fund referred to in paragraph 3.
Id.
121. 1d& Article 6(1) (b) limits aggregate amount to 59.7 million units of account.
Id.; see H.LY & SARPuE, supra note 14, at 909 (noting that future increases will provide
about US$290 million).
122. See CLC, supra note 12 (asserting that goals of CLC are uniform international
rules and procedures for determining liability and providing adequate compensation).
123. 1d. Article XII states:
This Convention shall supercede any International Conventions in force or
open for signature, ratification or accession at the date on which the Conven-
tion is opened for signature but only to the extent that such Conventions
would be in conflict with it; however, nothing in this Article shall affect the
obligations of Contracting States or non-Contracting States arising under such
International Conventions.
Id.
124. See id. (referring to 1924 and 1954 Conventions).
1514 FORDHAMINTERNVATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 23:1499
CLC from the territorial sea of a member nation 125 to the exclu-
sive economic zone of a member nation.126 By extending the
area covered by the CLC, the possibility of recovery became
greater.1 27 Prior to the 1992 amendments, there were no regula-
tions on liability in the exclusive economic zone, and oil pollu-
tion in this area went uncompensated. 128
The CLC is broad in scope because of the many nations that
are party to this convention. 2 9 If a vessel spills oil in CLC waters,
then CLC provisions apply, regardless of whether the shipowner
is a citizen of a member nation. 30 The CLC provisions do not,
however, apply to the vessels of member nations outside of CLC
waters.131
3. The Tanio
On March 7, 1980, the Tanio, a Madagascan tanker, spilled
over 7000 tons of crude oil off the coast of Brittany, France.13 2
The ship broke in half and the bow section sank with 5000 tons
125. Id. The Convention did not set specific limitations to the territorial sea, but
left the discretion to the member nations. Id.
126. 1992 Protocol, supra note 110. Article 3 states:
This Convention shall apply exclusively.
(a) To pollution damage caused:
(i) in the territory, including the territorial sea, of a Contracting State,
and
(ii) in the exclusive economic zone of a Contracting State, established in
accordance with international law, or, if a Contracting State has not
established such a zone, in an area beyond and adjacent to territorial
sea of that State determined by that State in accordance with interna-
tional law and extending not more than 200 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of its territorial sea is measured;
(b) to preventive measures, wherever taken to prevent or minimize such dam-
age.
Id.
127. See CHAo, supra note 18, at 156 (commenting that Protocols brought about
moderate enlargement of CLC by filling some gaps left by 1969 CLC).
128. See id. at 155 (noting that prior to 1992 amendments, those potentially liable
for pollution would be subject to national laws).
129. Id. at 74.
130. See id. (describing CLC and its relationship with other conventions).
131. See CLC, supra note 12, at art. XII (noting that CLC does not pertain to non-
member nations even if member nations spills in non-member waters).
132. See CHAo, supra note 18, at 105 (noting that on March 7, 1980, Tanio broke
because of bad weather conditions and polluted more than 200 kilometers of Brittany
Coast, causing great ecological damage).
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of cargo oil.'3 3 The stern section remained afloat with 7500 tons
of oil on board."3 4 To prevent further spillage from the stern
section, French response teams plugged the existing holes in the
hull and drilled new holes.' 35 French teams attached water lines
to the new holes and pumped hot water into the tanks, thereby
displacing the oil.'
3 6
About 100 parties presented claims to the IOPC. 3 7 The
IOPC awarded seventy percent of the damages of the spill.1
3 8
The early settlement of these claims seemed preferable to wait-
ing for judicial resolution. 39 At least one commentator views
the Tanio resolution as the most effective compensation agree-
ment in an oil pollution situation.'
40
In comparing clean-ups, many commentators prefer the re-
sults of the CLC to those of OPA.14' Both the Exxon Valdez ex-
perience in U.S. courts and the fourteen year litigation following
the Amoco Cadiz spill compared unfavorably to the resolution of
the Tanio spill. 42 After paying the claimants, the IOPC sought
compensation from the responsible parties under the provisions
of the CLC and general principals of liability.'
43
133. See id. (stating that bow section of Tanio sank to depth of 90 meters, from
which oil was pumped out to avoid more pollution from occurring).
134. See id. (noting that stern section of Tanio was towed to Le Harve).
135. See Caleb Solomon, Tanker Sinks; Most of Its Oil Is Still on Board, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 15, 1991, atA4 (describing technique used to displace oil in 1980 sinking of Tanio
as possibility of way to treat sinking of Haven off coast of Italy).
136. Id.
137. See id. at 105 (noting that claims presented to IOPC totaled 527 million
francs).
138. See Fontaine, supra note 54, at 106 (noting that damage assessment of Tanio
incident was 348 million francs and three to five years after Tanio spill, 70 percent of
estimate was paid).
139. See id. at 106 (all but a few claims relating to minor amounts were settled at
early stage).
140. See id. at 108 (noting efficiency with which IOPC handled suit because of insti-
tutionalization).
141. See id. (remarking that IOPC has been able to achieve aim-rapid compensa-
tion of victims based on well accepted principles); see also Daniel Kopec & Philip Peter-
son, Crude Legislation: Liability and Compensation Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 23
RUTGERS LJ. 597, 630 (1992).
142. Pollution Conventions Under Threat?, WoRLD INsURANcE REPORT, Mar. 12, 1993,
at 9.
143. See Fontaine, supra note 54, at 106 (describing allotment of damages in Tanio
case).
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4. The Braer
In January 1993, a single hulled Liberian registered vessel
was carrying over twenty-four million gallons of Norwegian light
crude oil from Norway to Canada."M On January 12 the ship
broke into several sections and leaked most of its oil onto the
Shetland Coastline due in part to bad weather. 4 The weather
prevented crews from working efficiently and the measures the
crews did take were ineffective in dispersing the oil.' 46
The CLC and IOPC handled the spill and approved of
nearly US$39.3 million in claims. 47 Realizing that the number
of claims filed exceeded the amount available, the IOPC sus-
pended the payments to Braer claimants in 1995.48 While some
parties pursued claims, many frustrated parties abandoned their
cases.
149
C. U.S. Regulation: The Oil Pollution Act of 1990
Before OPA, the United States had numerous laws concern-
ing the liability of shipowners. 5 ' The United States participated
in the CLC, but did not ratify it because the liability limits were
too low.' 5 ' The United States also participated in the 1984 CLC,
but did not ratify the protocols because the caps on liability were
144. See Gavin Souter, Spill Costs May Be Capped International Conventions on Oil Spill
Liability May Limit Insurer Payout to $32 Million, BusNmESS INsuRANCE, Jan. 11, 1993 (not-
ing that on January 5, 1993, Braer's engines failed during bad weather and tanker
grounded in Garth Ness, Shetland Islands, United Kingdom).
145. See Braer Crude Oil Tanker Splits as Weather Hinders Containmen OIL AND GAs.,
Jan. 18, 1993, at 26 (describing hull of tanker breaking into three sections as winds
gusted to 100 miles per hour).
146. See id. (asserting that rough weather actually helped disperse oil naturally,
preventing it from accumulating on Shetland shores).
147. See IOPC Fund Has Approved Nearly $39.3 Million in Claims from Braer Spill, OIL
SPILL INTELLGENcE REPORT, May 12, 1994, available in 1994 WL 2521994 (noting that
IOPC Fund approved 900 claims for property damage, damage to salmon, lost income,
and lost tourism).
148. See Rajesh Joshi, Braer Claims Could Drop Say IOPCF, LLoYD's Lisr, Aug. 23,
1999, available in 1999 WL 21567821 (reporting that £50.6 million were available, £46.3
million had already been paid and additional £5.2 million were approved).
149. Id.
150. See Gallagher, supra note 59, at 576 (asserting that U.S. laws provided various
levels of liability).
151. See CHAo, supra note 18, at 332 (describing U.S. desire for unlimited liability
provision).
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still insufficient. 5 2 The United States viewed the Amoco Cadiz
case as an example of the CLC's inefficiency.'53 After the Exxon
Valdez spill, the United States realized the need for better liabil-
ity laws.154 The United States passed OPA, setting forth a series
of standards requiring compliance of shipowners.15
1. Background
Scholars note that the United States depends on maritime
transport to satisfy its oil consumption requirements. 56 The
United States, therefore, faces higher risks of oil pollution inci-
dents than nations that import less oil.' 57 While the United
States has consistently taken an affirmative role in pollution leg-
islation, it has declined to ratify the CLC or its Protocols.' 5
During the 1969 CLC, representatives from U.S. coastal
states vigorously opposed ratification because it would preempt
state law.15 9 Some commentators argue that the United States
declined to join the CLC due to fear that the international
scheme failed to protect the extensive U.S. coastline from dam-
age caused by large spills.' 60 Officially, however, the United
States rejected the CLC on the grounds that the caps on liability
152. See Savage, supra note 19, at 346 (describing U.S. aspiration for higher liability
standards and increased limitation on liability standards).
153. Id.
154. See id. (explaining clean-up costs of Exxon Valdez spin).
155. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (1990).
156. See CHAo, supra note 18, at 272 (asserting that half of oil consumed in United
States comes from other countries and is carried by tankers and one-quarter of national
oil production is brought in from Alaska by means of tankers); see also G6ransson, supra
note 84 (explaining that in 1990, United States received about 460 million tons of oil);
BURGER, supra note 20, at 23 (noting that presently most major oil routes go from Mid-
dle East to Europe, Japan, and United States).
157. See BURGER, supra note 20, at 27 (discussing factors that have contributed to
growing number and size of oil spills including increases in amount of oil shipped and
size of oil tankers).
158. See MarkJ. Yost, International Maritime Law & the U.S. Admiralty Lawyer A Cur-
rent Assessmen 7 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 313, 314 (1995) (stating that United States has ratified
1990 Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response Convention, International Convention
on Salvage, 1974 Safety of Life at Sea Convention, and 1973 International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, among other international maritime con-
ventions).
159. See Smith, supra note 54, at 134 (arguing that one reason for resistance to
ratifying 1984 Protocols was issue of preemption of state rights).
160. See Savage, supra note 19, at 337 (explaining U.S. reasoning behind rejecting
CLC was legislation inadequately satisfying potential cost of clean-up for spills of great
magnitude); CHAo, supra note 18, at 76.
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were too restrictive.' 6 '
In 1984, the member nations of the CLC met to raise liabil-
ity limits and expand the scope. 6 2 The United States again par-
ticipated in the CLC, but refused to ratify the protocols without
specific changes. 163 The CLC did not make the appropriate
changes, and the United States declined to ratify the proto-
cols.'6
The decision not to ratify the CLC and its protocols left U.S.
oil spill liability law in a confusing array of statutes. 165 Scholars
note that prior to 1990, the existing statutes did not address the
issue of costs incurred by private individuals. 166 Furthermore,
provisions addressing compensation awards differed in each stat-
ute.1
67
Commentators note that the U.S. House of Representatives
and the Senate were aware that existing laws were inefficient, but
could not reach an agreement on how to treat liability for oil
spills.' 68 In 1989, the U.S. Congress proposed the Oil Pollution
161. See CHAo, supra note 18, at 221 (explaining that in addition to having lower
amount of maximum liability available than OPA, CLC also fails to provide for unlim-
ited liability).
162. See G6ransson, supra note 84, at 72 (citing inflation and Amoco Cadiz spill as
two reasons for 1984 amendments).
163. See Savage, supra note 19, at 346 (explaining that United States would ratify
only if international community increased liability standards, increased limitation of
liability standards, and gave broader geographic scope). When the proposed changes
were not made, the United States refused to ratify the CLC and continued domestic
debate on oil pollution regulation. Id.
164. See Edgar Gold, Marine Pollution Liability After "Exxon Valdez": The US. "All or
Nothing"Lottery!, 22J. MAR. L & COM. 423, 424 (1991) (arguing that when changes were
made in 1992, OPA was already successfully implemented in United States).
165. See Gallagher, supra note 59, at 576 (describing U.S. regime as providing vari-
ous levels of liability and compensation, which has proven confusing to everyone con-
cerned); see also Michael P. Donaldson, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Reaction and Re-
sponse, 3 ViL. ENVTL. LJ. 283, 286 (1992) (noting U.S. statutes included Clean Water
Act, Federal Water Pollution Control Act, provisions in Tide III of Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Acts Amendments of 1978, Deepwater Port Act of 1974, and Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Authorization Act).
166. See Kende, supra note 54, at 131 (noting that comprehensive legislation cov-
ered only clean-up costs incurred by State and Federal Authorities); Van Hanswyk, supra
note 76, at 319.
167. See Kende, supra note 54, at 132 (describing relevant Federal Statutes and
their provisions); see also Van Hanswyck, supra note 76, at 319 (noting that each statute
imposed separate liability limits, applied different definitions, and established separate
funds for compensation).
168. See Gallagher, supra note 59, at 611 (noting philosophical difference between
U.S. House of Representatives' favoring of implementation of international agreements
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Liability and Compensation Act of 1989,169 which limited ship-
owner's liability to US$60 million and created a fund financed
by the oil industry that would pay US$1 billion per incident to
clean-up pollution and compensate parties adversely affected by
a spill.' 7 0 The U.S. Senate proposed its own bill, the Oil Pollu-
tion Act of 1989,' 11 which created a US$1 billion fund available
for cleaning up spills, financed primarily by placing a US$.03 per
barrel tax on all domestic and imported oil. 17 2 The President
signed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,13 which combined aspects
of both the House and Senate proposals.'74
In 1992, the United States participated in the CLC, but re-
jected the amendments. 7 Most experts argue that the Exxon
Valdez" 6 disaster influenced the U.S. decision.' 77 The Exxon
spill created uncertainty as to whether the CLC could adequately
and Senate's favoring of domestic solutions); see also Russell V. Randle, The Oil Pollution
Act of 1990: Its Provisions, Intent & Effects, 21 ENvrL. L. REP. 10119 (1991) (explaining
that several times comprehensive oil spill bills were passed by one House, but because
conferees were unable to resolve political and philosophical differences over preemp-
tion of state law by federal standards and relationship between federal standards and
international conventions, none ever came to fruition).
169. H. Res. 1465, 101st Cong. (1989).
170. See Walter B. Jones, Oil Spill Compensation and Liability Legislation: WIen Good
Things Don't Happen to Good Bills, 19 ENvm. L. REP. 10333, 10337 (1989) (noting that
bill implemented protocols to IOPC Fund and CLC provisions). During the markup of
the bill, most debate occurred concerning the issue of state preemption. Id. Ulti-
mately, the bill offered to preempt state liability laws in tandem with a prohibition on
states assessing taxes on oil to pay damage claims covered by the federal fund. Id.; see
also Benjamin H. Grumbles &Joan M. Manley, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Legislation
in the Wake of a Crisis, NATURAL REsOURCEs & ENERGY 35 (1995) (noting that on Novem-
ber 9, 1989, House passed House Resolution 1465).
171. S. Res. 686, 101st Cong. (1989).
172. See Jones, supra note 170, at 10337 (asserting that on August 4, 1989, U.S.
Senate passed Senate Resolution 686 unanimously).
173. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (1990).
174. See Letter from GeorgeJ. Mitchell, Senate Majority Leader, to Samuel K. Skin-
ner, Secretary U.S. Department of Transportation, at 3 (Mar. 2, 1990).
175. See Savage, supra note 19, at 245 (noting that 1992 Protocols were introduced
as effort to encourage United States to join CLC because United States had one of
largest shipping fleets in world).
176. See HEALY & SHARPE, supra note 14, at 899 (commenting that Exxon Valdez
spilled estimated 262,000 barrels of crude oil into Prince William Sound). The Exxon
Valdez was a single hulled U.S. ship en route to Long Beach, California when it ran
aground on March 24, 1989. Id.
177. See Savage, supra note 19, at 346 (arguing that extravagant clean-up costs of
Exxon Valdez spill forced U.S. to enact appropriate legislation); see also CHo, supra
note 18, at 227 (arguing that Exxon Valdez spill was used as example of inadequacy of
compensation limits set by 1984 Protocols).
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remedy a large spill.' 78 Critics argue that the United States de-
termined that even with the 1992 changes, the CLC was not effi-
cient.17  The United States refuses to join an international con-
vention that provides lower compensation than that provided for
in OPA.'80
2. Provisions
OPA set forth-for the first time in maritime law-the pos-
sibility of unlimited liability to third parties for pollution caused
by oil discharge.' The four major themes of OPA are pollution
prevention, federalization, the idea that the polluter pays, and
antipreemption1 2 OPA sets forth increased safety standards
and requirements for oil tankers. 8 3 OPA also empowers the fed-
eral government to regulate oil spill clean-ups.' 4 Furthermore,
OPA imposes strictjoint, and several liability on the responsible
party and has a broad scope of recoverable damages. 85  OPA
178. See Savage, supra note 19, at 346 (noting that clean-up costs of Exxon Valdez
exceeded US$2.5 billion).
179. See id. (arguing that CLC was not efficient because it did not provide for un-
limited liability).
180. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 3001 (1990).
181. See Kende, supra note 54, at 136 (noting that limitation provisions of OPA are
not exclusive and discharges may be subject to unlimited liability for pollution proxi-
mately caused by discharge).
182. See Grumbles & Manley, supra note 170, at 35 (commenting that while federal-
ization and antipreemption were from start included in negotiations, other issues grew
in importance as negotiations continued).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (2) (1990). Section 2702 states:
The damages referred to in subsection (a) of this section are the following:
(A) Natural Resources
Damages for injury to, destruction of, loss of, or loss of use of, natural
resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing the damage,
which shall be recoverable by a United States trustee, a State trustee,
an Indian tribe trustee, or a foreign trustee.
(B) Real or personal property
Damages for injury to, or economic losses resulting from destruction
of, real or personal property, which shall be recoverable by a claim-
ant who owns or leases that property.
(C) Subsistence use
Damages for loss of subsistence use of natural resources, which shall
be recoverable by any claimant who so uses natural resources which
have been injured, destroyed, or lost, without regard to the owner-
ship or management of the resources.
(D) Revenues
Damages equal to the net loss of taxes, royalties, rents, fees, or net
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limits the defenses of responsible parties.'86 Finally, OPA ex-
pressly avoids preempting state legislation.' 87
Scholars note that OPA's main concern is to ensure that
profit shares due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real property,
personal property, or natural resources, which shall be recoverable
by the Government of the United States, a State, or a political subdi-
vision thereof.
(E) Profits and earning capacity
Damages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of earning capac-
ity due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal
property, or natural resources, which shall be recoverable by any
claimant.
(F) Public Services
Damages for net costs of providing increased or additional public
services during or after removal activities, including protection from
fire, safety, or health hazards, caused by a discharge of oil, which shall
be recoverable by a State, or a political subdivision of a State.
Id.
186. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2730 (1990). Section 2730 lists defenses to lia-
bility:
(a) Complete defenses
A responsible party is not liable for removal costs or damages under sec-
tion 2702 of this title if the responsible party established, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that the discharge or substantial threat of discharge
of oil and the resulting damages or removal costs were caused solely by-
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war,
(3) an act or omission of a third party, other than an employee whose act
or omission occurs in connection with any contractual relationship
with the responsible party (except where the sole contractual arrange-
ment arises in connection with carriage by a common carrier by rail),
if the responsible party establishes by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that the responsible party-
(A) exercised due care with respect to the oil concerned, taking into
consideration the characteristics of the oil and in light of all rele-
vant facts and circumstances; and
(B) took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any
such third party and the foreseeable consequences of those acts
or omissions or
(4) any combination of paragraphs (1), (2), and (3).
Id.
187. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2718 (1990). Section 2718 states:
(a) Preservation of State authorities; Solid Waste Disposal Act
Nothing in this chapter or the Act of March 3, 1851 shall-
(1) Affect, or be construed or interpreted as preempting, the authority of
any State or political subdivision thereof from imposing any addi-
tional liability or requirements with respect to-
(A) the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within such State; or
(B) any removal activities in connection with such a discharge; or
(2) affect, or be construed or interpreted to affect
or modify in any way the obligations or liabilities of any person under
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parties injured by an oil spill are compensated for their dam-
ages.'18  OPA requires proof of financial ability to pay for a spill
prior to a ship's entrance in U.S. waters.' 8 1 OPA sets a high level
of maximum liability and allows claimants to pursue claims
against any and all responsible parties.'90 Furthermore, by im-
posing unlimited liability on grossly negligent polluters, OPA at-
tempts to promote safety and pollution prevention before spills
occur.' 9 ' Finally, OPA preserves states' rights to pass their own
the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 6901 et. seq.) or State law,
including common law.
Id.
188. See Smith, supra note 54, at 136 (describing OPA as comprehensive, creating
liability and compensation regime, prevention and removal plan, research and develop-
ment program, and establishing oil spill liability trust fund); see also Wilkinson, supra
note 107, at 190 (noting that OPA expanded liability and compensation regimes found
in previous bills).
189. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2716 (1990). Section 2716 states:
Financial Responsibility
(a) Requirement
The responsible party for-
(1) any vessel over 300 gross tons (except a non-self propelled vessel that
does not carry oil as cargo or fuel) using any place subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States; or
(2) any vessel using the waters of the exclusive economic zone to trans-
ship or lighter oil destined for a place subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States;
shall establish and maintain, in accordance with regulations promulgated
by the Secretary, evidence of financial responsibility sufficient to meet the
maximum amount of liability to which the responsible party could be sub-
jected under section 2704 (a) or (d) of this title, in a case where the re-
sponsible party would be entitled to limit liability under that section. If
the responsible party owns or operates more than one vessel, evidence of
financial responsibility need be established only to meet the amount of
the maximum liability applicable to the vessel having the greatest maxi-
mum liability.
Id.
190. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (1990). Section 2702 states:
Elements of Liability
(a) In general
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject to the
provisions of this chapter, each responsible party for a vessel or a fa-
cility from which oil is discharged, or which poses the substantial
threat of a discharge of oil, into or upon the navigable waters or ad-
joining shorelines or the exclusive economic zone is liable for the
removal costs and damages specified in subsection (b) that result
from such incident.
Id.
191. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c) (1990). Section 2704 excludes:
Exceptions
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liability laws if they are not satisfied with OPA's compensation
level. 192
Under OPA, recovery is available from the registered owner
of the vessel, as well as from any person operating or chartering
the vessel if that person is wholly responsible for the spill.' 93
OPA institutes a minimum level of liability, dependant upon the
size of the polluting vessel.1 4 Scholars agree that OPA's broad
definitions expand the scope of liability and provide injured par-
ties with a great chance of recovery for damages.' 95
OPA sets forth situations under which the responsible party
is held liable for the total costs of the clean-up.' 96 OPA provides
the U.S. President with a catch-all provision-the ability to adjust
liability limits if it is deemed necessary.' 97 Critics argue that this
restricts the shipowner from the opportunity to benefit from the
traditional maritime right of limited liability.198
(1) Acts of responsible party
Subsection (a) of this section does not apply if the incident was proxi-
mately caused by-
(A) gross negligence or willful misconduct of, or
(B) the violation of an applicable Federal safety, construction, or operat-
ing regulation by, the responsible party, an agent or employee of the
responsible party, or a person acting pursuant to a contractual rela-
tionship with the responsible party (except where the sole contrac-
tual arrangement arises in connection with carriage by a common
carrier by rail).
Id.
192. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2718 (1990).
193. See id § 2701(32) (defining "responsible party" as any person owning, operat-
ing, or demise chartering vessel). OPA uses an equation to determine the maximum
amount of liability of a ship owner and caps liability at an amount that allows for greater
compensation to aggrieved parties. Id.; see also CHAo, supra note 18, at 241 (comment-
ing that victim can pursue claim against both owner of vessel and person operating it,
increasing possibility of recovery).
194. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a) (1990) (setting maximum liability of
responsible party at greater of US$1200 per gross ton or US$10 million if vessel is over
3000 gross tons, or US$2 million if vessel is less than 3000 gross tons).
195. See Savage, supra note 19, at 358 (remarking that this expansive approach
encourages all parties involved in transport of oil to follow appropriate regulations and
guidelines to avoid liability); see also Wilkinson, supra note 107, at 204 (noting that OPA
deletes limitations requiring claimant to show physical damage to proprietary interests
before economic damage could be awarded).
196. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c) (1990).
197. See id § 2704(d) (3) (asserting that President has full authority to determine
when it is necessary to adjust limits of liability).
198. See Sweeney, supra note 16, at 161 (alleging that limitation of liability is ship-
owners ancient right to cut losses from marine disasters); ASHBURaNR, supra note 29.
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Under OPA, compensation is available from two sources. 199
First the victim obtains compensation from the responsible
party.20 0 Outstanding costs are recoverable under the Oil Spill
Liability Trust Fund ("Trust Fund") .201 The Trust Fund, origi-
nally established by § 9509 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, 22 is designed to cover the clean-up costs of the federal
government, state governments, and uncompensated private
ventures up to US$1 billion.20 3
199. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (1990).
200. See id. (assigning liability for oil spill to party responsible for spilling oil).
201. See I.RC. § 9509(a) (1990) (establishing in U.S. Treasury "Oil Spill Liability
Trust Fund" consisting of amount as may be appropriated). Section 9509(b) states:
(b) Transfers to Trust Fund. - There are hereby appropriated to the Oil Spill
Liability Trust Fund amounts equivalent to-
(1) taxes received in the Treasury under section 4611 (relating to envi-
ronmental tax on petroleum) to the extent attributable to the Oil
Spill Liability Trust Fund financing rate under section 4611 (c).
(2) amounts received under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 for damages to
natural resources which are required to be deposited in the Fund
under section 1006(f) of such Act,
(3) amounts received by such Trust Fund under section 1015 of such Act,
(4) amounts required to be transferred by such Act from the revolving
fund established under section 311 (k) of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act,
(5) amounts required to be transferred by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
from the Deepwater Port Liability Fund established under section
18(f) of the Deepwater Port Act of 1974,
(6) amounts required to be transferred by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
from the Offshore Oil Pollution Compensation Fund established
under section 302 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amend-
ments of 1978,
(7) amounts required to be transferred by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
from the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund established under sec-
tion 204 of the Trans-AIaska Pipeline Authorization Act, and
(8) any penalty paid pursuant to section 311 of the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act, section 309(c) of such Act (as a result of violations
of such section 311), the Deepwater Port Act of 1974, or section 207
of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act.
Id.; see also I.R.C. § 9602(b) (1990) (giving U.S. Secretary of Treasury duty of investing
excess Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund proceeds).
202. I.RC. § 9509(a) (1990). Section 9509 states "There is established in the
Treasury of the United States a trust fund to be known as the "Oil Spill Liability Trust
Fund," consisting of such amounts as may be appropriated or credited to such Trust
Fund as provided in this section or section 9602(b)." Id.
203. Id. § 9509. Section 9509(c) (2) (A) states: "US$1,000,000,000 per incident,
etc.-The maximum amount which may be paid from the Oil Spill Liability Trust fund
with respect to-(i) any single incident shall not exceed US$1,000,000,000, and (ii)
natural resource damage assessments and claims in connection with any single incident
shall not exceed US$500,000,000." Id.
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OPA expressly recognizes a state's power to establish it's
own compensation funds and demand certificates of financial re-
sponsibility. 20 4 State-regulated funds co-exist with the Trust
Fund and act as a third source of recovery.20 5 Legal experts note
that many coastal states have implemented their own schemes,
imposing liability on either the shipowner or the cargo owner.20 6
Claimants from other nations may recover from responsible
parties in some situations.20 7 Generally, however, § 2707 of OPA
bars international claimants from availing themselves to the rem-
edies provided by OPA unless there is an express agreement be-
tween the United States and the claimant's home nation.
20 8
204. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2718 (1990); see Kopec & Peterson, supra note
141 at 628 (noting that Congress gave three reasons for maintaining states rights-first,
that legislation was within states police power;, second, states' would need to respond
quickly to oil spills; and third, judgment that states' imposition of higher liability limits
would encourage shippers to maintain their trade routes).
205. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2718 (1990).
206. See Grumbles & Manley, supra note 170, at 38 (noting that Alabama, Alaska,
California, Florida, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey,
Oregon, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin have enacted state laws);
see also Kende, supra note 54, at 143 (describing Alaska's provision imposing strict liabil-
ity on dischargers and owners of oil for dischargers of oil into Alaskan waters).
207. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2707 (1990). Section 2707 (b) states:
A claimant may make a claim for removal costs and damages resulting from a
discharge, or substantial threat of discharge, of oil in or on the territorial sea,
internal waters or adjacent shoreline of a foreign country, only if the discharge
is from-
(1) an Outer Continental Shelf facility or a deepwater port;
(2) a vessel in the navigable waters;
(3) a vessel carrying oil as cargo between two places in the United States; or
(4) a tanker that received the oil at the terminal of the pipeline constructed
under the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (43 U.S.C. 1651 et
seq.), for transportation to a place in the United States and the discharge
or threat occurs prior to delivery into that place.
Id.
208. I& Section 2707(a) states:
Required showing by foreign claimants
(1) In general
In addition to satisfying the other requirements of this chapter, to recover
removal costs or damages resulting from an incident a foreign claimant
shall demonstrate that-
(A) the claimant has not been otherwise compensated for the removal
costs or damages; and
(B) recovery is authorized by a treaty or executive agreement between the
United States and the claimants country, or the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the Attorney General and other appropriate offi-
cials, has certified that the claimants country provides a comparable
remedy for United States claimants.
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Some scholars note that the United States is attempting to
broaden the scope of OPA.20 9
3. The Amoco Cadiz
The Amoco Cadiz was a state-of-the-art 228,513-ton tanker,
transporting Iranian crude oil from Karg Island, Iran and Ras
Tanura, Saudi Arabia to Rotterdam, Amsterdam. ° On March
16, 1978, the Amoco Cadiz ran aground off the coast of France,
spilling almost 220,000 tons of oil into the Atlantic Ocean, creat-
ing an oil slick eighteen miles wide and eighty miles long.21
Clean-up crews arrived to remove the oil, but the response teams
were ill-equipped to rehabilitate the damages to the beaches and
wildlife.212
CLC remedies were available to the parties injured by the
Amoco Cadiz spill.215 Article 1382 of the French Civil Code al-
lows victims to choose their remedies.2 1 4 Even though France
was a party to the CLC, the Amoco Cadiz claimants opted to
Id.; see Popp, supra note 36, at 126 (arguing that reason for agreements is to show that
claimant's country will provide comparable remedy for U.S. claimant should spill hap-
pen in their waters).
209. See Popp, supra note 36, at 126 (explaining that if spill affects United States
and Canada, then shipowner will be responsible under both laws); see also CHAo, supra
note 18 (alleging that because United States is predominant in oil industry, United
States can determine fate of liability).
210. See BURGER, supra note 20, at 38 (noting that unlike Torrey Canyon, Amoco
Cadiz had been built with safety in mind); see also In the Matter of Oil Spill by the
Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of France on March 16, 1978, 954 F.2d 1279, 1285 (7th Cir.
1992) (asserting that Amoco Cadiz measured 1095 feet long and 167 feet wide and
weighed 230,000 deadweight tons). The Italian crew of the Amoco Cadiz was exper-
ienced and the officers were all properly licensed. In the Matter of Oil Spil supra, at
1287. The route of the vessel was around the Cape of Good Hope. Id.
211. See BURGER, supra note 20, at 38 (noting that Amoco Cadiz was driven ashore
by gale force winds). After an investigation, it was determined that the faulty design of
the machinery was the cause of the accident. Id. at 39. The failure to summon assist-
ance sooner escalated the damage, causing a total of 68.7 million gallons of oil to be
spilled into the seas. Id.
212. See id. (describing clean-up efforts of 2200 men and 50 vessels including ships
and personnel from British Royal Navy). Sufficient technologies to rehabilitate beaches
and injured wildlife had not yet been developed. Id.
213. See Fontaine, supra note 54, at 102 (explaining that Amoco Cadiz's registered
owner, Amoco Transport, immediately set up limitation fund of 77 francs). By estab-
lishing fault or privity in a French court, the injured parties could have collected the
fund. Id.
214. See In the Matter of Amoco Cad, 954 F.2d at 1311 (finding that even though
France was party to 1969 CLC, nothing in CLC precluded victims from claiming com-
pensation outside of CLC from persons other than owner, his servants, or agents).
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bring suits in a U.S. court.2 15 After thirteen years of litigation,
the suit was finally decided and Amoco's parent company was
held liable for the spill.216
4. The Exxon Valdez
The Exxon Valdez was a 211,469-ton, 987-foot U.S. owned
tanker transporting 53 million gallons of oil from the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline terminal at Valdez, Alaska to California. 7 After
hitting a shoal on the sea bottom, 11 million gallons of crude oil
leaked from eight of the ships' eleven cargo tanks and dispersed
oil over 1300 miles of the Alaskan coastline.2 1 8 Environmental-
ists argue that U.S. authorities exacerbated the damage caused
by the Exxon Valdez with their poor response time.2 19
215. See id. at 1309 (noting that when Amoco Cadiz sank, cap on recovery was 77
million francs (approximately US$16 million at rate of exchange)); In re Oil Spill by
Amoco Cadiz off Coast of France on March 16, 1978, 699 F.2d 909, 912 (7th Cir., 1993)
(explaining that principal defendants of initial suit were Astilleros and various affiliates
of Standard Oil Company, including Amoco Transport Company, owner of Amoco Ca-
diz). When the plaintiffs brought suit in the United States, the affiliates of the ship
owner's parent company moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming a lack of subject
matterjurisdiction. In re Oil Spill, supra. The district court denied the motions and the
U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Id. In 1993, the Court of Appeals awarded
damages with interest to France and Petroleum Insurance Limited, totaling US$160
million. Id.
216. See Fontaine, supra note 54, at 105 (comparing outcome of litigation to what
would have been recovered under CLC). The aggrieved parties were able to overcome
the limitation of liability set by the CLC; the compensation received was five times the
amount that would have been recoverable under the IOPC. Id. The court also reached
beyond the CLC's limitation of liability to the registered owner of the vessel, holding
the party who was in fact responsible for the pollution liable. Id. at 106.
217. See JOHN KEEBLE, OUT OF THE CHA.NNEL, THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL IN
PrINcE Wi-LAM SoUND 32 (1991) (noting that on March 23, crew of Exxon Valdez
loaded cargo tanks with 1,286,738 barrels of Alaskan crude oil at Alyeska Terminal in
Port Valdez).
218. See HEALY & SHA"RE, supra note 14, at 899 (discussing that cause of spill was
determined to be negligent navigation). While protocol called for three watchmen on
the bridge, as well as a lookout, the third mate was alone on the bridge at the time of
the grounding. Id. It was discovered after the accident that the ship had been locked
in auto pilot mode. Id. Captain Joseph Hazelwood, the ship's master, had gone to his
cabin shortly before the accident. Id. A blood test given to Hazelwood 10 hours after
the grounding of the Exxon Valdez indicated a high alcohol level. Id.
219. See Exxon Valdez Oil SpilL Introduction (visited on Apr. 13, 2000) <http://li-
brary.thinkquest.org/10867/intro/index.shtmnl> (on file with the Fordham International
LaroJournal) (explaining that four Principle issues that were problems over first three
or four days of spill were: a) inadequacy of Alyeska response, b) handoff of spill from
Alyeska to Exxon, c) disagreement about how to disperse oil, d) lack of cleanup re-
sources).
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At the time of the Exxon Valdez spill, the state mandated
contingency plan in Alaska required containment of any oil spill
within five hours.22' Fourteen hours passed from the time of the
spill until the first clean-up crew arrived at the site.221 An addi-
tional twenty-one hours elapsed before containment equipment
surrounded the site.222 By this time, the oil had spread so much
that chemical dispersants became ineffective.223 For many days
after the spill, oil continued to flow from the ship, devastating
the Alaskan shores and wildlife.2 24
Under U.S. law, Exxon paid at least US$3 billion in clean-up
costs. 225 This spill underscored the need to amend the U.S. sys-
tem for handling oil spills. 226 The Exxon Valdez spill also
brought an end to the fifteen year Congressional debate about
the best way to treat liability for clean-up.227
II. ANALYZING THE CLC AND OPA: MERITS
AND SHORTCOMINGS
Some commentators note that the CLC is the best solution
for the oil spill liability problem because it is an international
220. See HEALY & SHsakE, supra note 14, at 899 (describing contingency plan of
Alyeksa Pipeline Service Co., manager of pipeline, for handling 200,000 barrel spill).
To prepare for spills, the U.S. government has set forth the requirement for a Ship-
board Oil Pollution Emergency Plan that describes the procedure for reporting an oil
pollution incident, the agencies that are to be contacted, the actions to be taken on
board to reduce or control the discharge of oil, and the contact person for response
activities. Id. at 902.
221. See i& at 899 (explaining that when response teams finally contained Exxon
Valdez, efforts were ineffective).
222. Id.
223. See id. (asserting that although clean-up crews attempted to use booms,
fences, and skimmers, so much oil had spread that they did not work).
224. See K BLr.E, supra note 217, at 264 (noting that otters were restored to health
at cost of over US$90,000 each and cost of rehabilitating birds was US$25,000 each); see
also S. REP. No. 99, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989) (reporting that because Alaskan
natives depend on fish and wildlife for subsistence, harm to society was great). The
restoration of Alaskan Wildlife alone after the spill is estimated to have cost US$41
million. S. REP. No. 99, supra.
225. See CssAo, supra note 18, at 227 n.55 (noting that Exxon agreed to pay US$1.1
billion to settle governments claims and US$1.125 billion to settle litigation in addition
to its own clean-up costs). If existing laws were applied, then the compensation would
have been US$46 million. Id.
226. Id.
227. See id. (explaining that Exxon Valdez spill was final factor in U.S. decision not
to ratify 1984 Protocols and incentive to implement domestic law).
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solution to an international problem.228  Other authors argue,
however, that until the United States becomes a party to the
CLC, the CLC will not be an efficient compensation system.
2 29
OPA creates a system for those injured by oil spills in the United
States to resolve conflicts quickly and efficiently.2 30 At the same
time, however, OPA prevents uniformity in liability law and cre-
ates the possibility of no recovery.3 '
A. Merits and Shortcomings of CLC
The CLC is effective because it represents the international
nature of the oil transport industry. 2  The remedies under the
CLC are broad because of the numerous member nations.233
The CLC allows for seizure of ships in any member nation,
thereby ensuring compensation even if the responsible party has
no assets in the country in which a spill occurs.234 Since the
United States is a major maritime nation, the CLC lacks a funda-
mental element without U.S. participation.233 In order to reach
its goals, the CLC must raise liability limits and broaden defini-
lions.23
6
228. See Frederick J. Carr, Statutory Liability for Oil Pollution from Vessels in Marine
Environments, 3 U.S.F. MAP- L.J. 267, 323 (1991); Smith, supra note 54, at 143 (arguing
that OPA is significantly limited because only addresses oil spill pollution on national
basis); Van Hanswyk, supra note 76, at 342 (asserting necessity of worldwide standards of
civil liability).
229. See G6ransson, supra note 84, at 76 (noting that IOPC would benefit if United
States shared burden of contribution); see also Wilkinson et al., supra note 107, at 224
(asserting that reason for failure of 1984 Protocols was that United States did notjoin).
230. See Wilkinson et al., supra note 107, at 235 (asserting that OPA provisions are
clear and allow claimants to recover more damages than would be available under
CLC).
231. See Smith, supra note 54, at 143-44 (concluding that shipowners without at-
tachable property may escape all liability).
232. See Carr, supra note 228, at 323 (commenting that risk of environmental dam-
ages are present wherever oil is transported); Smith, supra note 54, at 150 (noting that
international action is necessary to resolve international oil spill problem).
233. See R~mond-Gouilloud, supra note 103, at 85 (emphasizing large number of
contributors to CLC sharing liability for spills).
234. See Smith, supra note 54, at 144 (asserting that CLG establishes broadjurisdic-
tion).
235. See G6ransson, supra note 84, at 76 (noting CLC dependence upon involve-
ment of major maritime nations such as Japan).
236. See Yost, supra note 158, at 336 (explaining that limits must be adjusted to
reach current standards).
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1. Arguments in Favor of the CLC
Many commentators argue that because oil transport is an
international industry, oil spills are international problems, re-
quiring international solutions.23 7 Legal critics opine that by re-
fusing to join the CLC, the United States has deprived individual
states of the advantages of the CLC. 38 Authors support the CLC
because even though a spill may occur in one country, the ef-
fects of the spill may be felt worldwide. 3 9
Some legal commentators argue that because the CLC is in-
ternational, the available remedies are inherently broader than
those available under a domestic regime.240 Critics also state
that even though the amount of monetary damages recovered
under OPA might be greater, the possibility of recovery is
greater under the CLC.241 Under the CLC, claimants are able to
recover from .more defendants, making the available funds
greater. 42
Many commentators support the CLC because oil transpor-
tation is an international industry, which puts many people at
237. See Carr, supra note 228, at 323 (commenting that laws of nature transcendjurisdictional boundaries); Smith, supra note 54, at 150 (calling for unified interna-
tional action); Van Hanswyk, supra note 76, at 342 (asserting that international uniform
liability system would prevent forum shopping).
238. See CHAo, supra note 18, at 273 (explaining that under CLC, member nations
have right to seize another ship belonging to liable party that may be located in any
other member nation); Kopec & Peterson, supra note 141, at 599 (noting that CLC sets
forth necessary uniform standard); see also Kende, supra note 54, at 147 (asserting that
OPA has dramatically affected cost and created problems for carriers from other na-
tions).
239. See CHAO, supra note 18, at 229 (noting that CLC seeks to protect all seas and
oceans, notjust those in United States); Sweeney, supra note 16, at 157 (listing dangers
from oil pollution as: destruction of fish, shellfish, sea birds, fishing gear, or beach
installations; creation of fire hazards in ports; fouling of small boats; and loss of natural
beauty).
240. See Smith, supra note 54, at 143 (noting that CLC members have right to seize
ships belonging to liable parties located in any other member state); see also CHAo, supra
note 18, at 273 (asserting that members of CLC have added guarantee of compensa-
tion).
241. See Smith, supra note 54, at 144 (noting that CLC establishes jurisdiction over
all signatory tankers and ensures that potential claimants have means of compensa-
tion); see also Wilkinson et al., supra note 107, at 229 (describing House-Senate Confer-
ence Committee debate calling for united international, federal, and state effort for oil
spill liability and compensation).
242. See R~mond-Gouilloud, supra note 103, at 85 (asserting that greater compen-
sation is available under CLC due to greater number of contributors to fund than
under OPA).
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risk of pollution damage.243 Critics note that an international
system spreads the risk and costs of oil pollution damage over a
large number of nations instead of forcing one nation to bear
the entire cost of clean-up.24 Legal scholars encourage the
United States to join the international regime, arguing that U.S.
participation will encourage other countries to join. 24
2. Criticisms of the CLC
In order to be successful, the CLC needs all major maritime
nations as members.246 Some authors assert that the CLC is inef-
ficient because the United States is not a member.247 Critics ar-
gue that if all major maritime nations joined the CLC, then it
would be able to reach higher fund limits and provide greater
compensation to those injured by spills. 248
Critics of the CLC find the limits of liability too low and the
international definition of environmental damage too limit-
243. See i& at 85 (commenting that OPA is significantly limited because it only
addresses oil spill pollution on national basis); see also Wilkinson et al., supra note 107,
at 234 (noting that oil pollution compensation scheme will not be complete without
international participation).
244. See Yost, supra note 158, at 336 (asserting that international regime spreads
risks and costs of oil pollution between shipowners and cargo interests over numerous
nations); see also Smith, supra note 54, at 144 (noting that burden of cleaning spill falls
under oil industry and consumers globally); R~mond-Gouilloud, supra note 103, at 85
(suggesting that greater number of contributors means more compensation).
245. See Gransson, supra note 84, at 76 (notingJapanese oil industry bearing dis-
proportionately large burden for operation of IOPC-if United States joined, then bur-
den would be split); see also CHAO, supra note 18, at 215 (arguing that U.S. unilateral
solution is extrinsic threat to existence of CLO); Dr. I.C. White, The Voluntary Oil Spill
Compensation Agreements-TOVALOP and CRISTAL, in LiABiumT FOR DAMAGE TO THE
MARINE ENVIRONMENr 69 (Colin M. De La Rue ed., 1993) (noting that U.S. lead could
attract other nations to enact legislation).
246. See CHAO, supra note 18, at 387 (recognizing that 1992 Protocol required rati-
fication by 10 states, including four with more than one million units of gross tanker
tonnage to come into force); Yost, supra note 158, at 341 (explaining that 1992 Proto-
cols implemented cap on IOPC contributions because it was necessary for Japanese
ratification).
247. See Gransson, supra note 84, at 76 (reasoning that CLC is dependant upon
participation of certain maritime nations); CHAo supra note 18, at 7 (given that United
States occupies prime position in international oil movement, unilateral U.S. action
reduces effectiveness of CLC).
248. See GCrannson, supra note 84, at 76 (describing statistics of Japans contribu-
tion and receipt of money); Yost, supra note 158, at 341 (noting effect if Japan would
not have ratified 1992 Protocols); Smith, supra note 54, at 144 (arguing that with U.S.
participation, insurance certificates would be recognized internationally).
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ing.24  After the Exxon Valdez spill and the ensuing clean-up
costs, the United States rejected the 1992 Protocols because the
limits were too low.2 50 At least one scholar suggests that to cre-
ate an effective uniform liability system, the differences between
OPA and the CLC must be resolved. 1
B. Merits and Shortcomings of OPA
Experts argue that OPA's provisions are designed to resolve
conflicts. 25 2 OPA creates strict requirements, which pressure oil
companies internationally to comply.255 In practice, OPA has
helped create safer design requirements and higher liability lim-
its internationally.5 4 However, by allowing states to implement
their own laws, OPA fails to create a uniform system.2 55 Even
with strict state laws, shipowners have found loopholes that allow
them to circumvent requirements. 2 6 OPA applies only to assets
subject to U.S. jurisdiction, therefore, shipowners without assets
in the United States can travel in OPA waters without liability.2 5 7
249. SeeYost, supra note 158, at 336 (asserting that for 1990s, CLC limits of liability
are too low and definitions are too narrow); see also CAo, supra note 18, at 133 (noting
inadequacy of available compensation available to claimants).
250. See CHAo, supra note 18, at 227 (application of CLC would have resulted in
US$60 million compensation); Kopec & Peterson, supra note 141, at 627.
251. See CHAo, supra note 18, at 275 (arguing that if differences between OPA and
CLC cannot be resolved, then there is danger for future of CLC).
252. See Popp, supra note 36, at 119 (noting that OPA attempts to make liability
clear before spill occurs).
253. See Kopec & Peterson, supra note 141, at 627 (asserting that enhanced liability
provision implicates both international and state law); Jeffrey D. Morgan, The Oil Pollu-
tion Act of 1990: A Look at Its Impact on the Oil Industry, 6 FORDHAM ENwrL. LJ. 1, 11
(1994) (noting that since OPA, many companies have implemented thorough inspec-
tion programs for chartered vessels); Yost, supra note 158, at 334 (recognizing 1992
study showing that younger, safer ships were coming to U.S. ports).
254. See Smith, supra note 54, at 150 (asserting that OPA strict liability regime will
indirectly force international oil industry to be more responsible). The double hull
requirement of OPA will not only help to prevent unnecessary spills, but also will serve
as an example to the international community. Id.; Donaldson, supra note 165, at 319.
255. See Kende, supra note 54, at 147 (describing OPA as disappointment because
of failure to pre-empt state law).
256. See Shell Halts Call at US Mainland, LLoYD's LsT, June 12, 1990 (describing
major shipping company's U.S. boycott).
257. See Smith, supra note 54, at 143 (asserting that many tanker owners from
other countries do not have property subject to attachment in United States and there-
fore have no fear of assets being taken if there is spill).
2000] INADEQUACIES OF THE OIL POLLUTION ACT 1533
1. Arguments in Favor of OPA
Some writers argue that OPA is more adequately designed
than the CLC to resolve legal conflicts.258 Although the CLC sets
forth guidelines for distributing money for clean-up after a spill,
it is still likely that there will be litigation.25 9 OPA explicitly de-
fines claimants and sets forth guidelines for the adjudication.
Some legal experts opine that OPA intentionally expanded
the scope of liability and the number of possible defendants in
the hopes that it would encourage voluntary precautionary meas-
ures by potential defendants.261 Critics claim that by creating
stricter requirements on a domestic level, the United States chal-
lenged oil companies to become safer.262 While OPA's provi-
sions only apply to one country, commentators argue that they
are broader than they seem, influencing the safety of oil tankers
worldwide.263
When OPA was first implemented, commentators expressed
fear that inferior ships would carry U.S. oil imports because of
fear of liability; in fact the opposite happened and safety has in-
creased in oil transport in the United States.2 ' The United
258. See id. at 143 (noting that OPA drafters used insight from Exxon Valdez spill
to include strict preventive legislation); see also Popp, supra note 36, at 119 (asserting
that while OPA has similar defenses to CLO, OPA adds important qualifications to nar-
row defenses); see also Wilkinson et al., supra note 107, at 235 (arguing that OPA pro-
vides better and quicker compensation than CLC).
259. See Randle, supra note 168 (noting that under OPA, remedies in admiralty
and maritime law are still available).
260. Id.
261. See Morgan, supra note 253, at 12 (remarking that OPA's stiff liability provi-
sions have caused shippers to rethink traditional shipping routes); see also Amy McKaig,
Comment, Liability for Oil Tanker Spills, 44 Sw. LJ. 1599, 1629 (1991) (asserting that
OPA provisions on crew standards and double hull requirements are valuable world-
wide).
262. See Kopec & Peterson, supra note 141, at 627 (asserting that increased finan-
cial requirements coupled with enhanced liability could help to minimize risks); see also
Popp, supra note 36, at 129 (remarking that OPA large compensation brings pressure
on other nations to accommodate).
263. See Morgan, supra note 253, at 11 (arguing that companies have established
more thorough inspection programs for chartered vessels to comply with OPA); Yost,
supra note 153, at 334 (suggesting that OPA has served as model for international mari-
time industry).
264. See Morgan, supra note 253, at 11 (noting that industry's prediction has not
proven accurate and that in fact there has been small but noticeable improvement in
safety of chartered tankers); see also Office of Domestic & Int'l Energy Policy, United
States Dep't of Energy, Transporting U.S. Oil Imports: The Impact of Oil Spill Legislation on
the Tanker Market prepared by the Petroleum Industry Research Foundation, June 1992
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States is a leader in the oil transport industry; shippers are
forced to comply with the stringent standards to stay in compefi-
don.2 6 5 By complying with OPA's standards to travel in U.S. wa-
ters, international transport companies are effectuating OPA
standards throughout the world.
2 61
Many commentators assert that although U.S. refusal to rat-
ify the international protocols may have initially hurt the CLC,
OPA's enactment could ultimately lead to safer design require-
ments for vessels worldwide.2 67 The 1992 Protocols were pro-
posed in an effort to encourage the United States to join the
international community.2 68 Even without U.S. participation,
the Protocols succeeded in bringing about higher liability limits
in the international community.
269
2. Criticism of OPA
Many authors express concern regarding OPA's provision
allowing states to implement their own pollution liability stat-
utes-even if they are inconsistent with OPA.2 10 Critics hold that
(finding that shipowners have made attempt to change operational procedures, safety
provisions and inspection routines).
265. See CHAo, supra note 18, at 266 (discussing impact of OPA on oil cargo own-
ers, banks, and insurance markets-industries involved in oil transport that cannot
avoid trading with United States); see also New P1RTNC Report Analyzes Impact of Spill Legis-
lation on Tanker Market OIL SPILL U.S. LAW REPORT CUTrER INFORMATION CORP., July 1,
1992 (noting general consensus that maximum control is industry's best bet). But see
Morgan, supra note 253, at 12 (asserting that insurance industry have refused to issue
proof of financial responsibility and regulators have refrained from enforcing require-
ments).
266. See Morgan, supra note 253, at 11 (noting improved relationship between
shipowners and charterers to work together to comply with OPA); McKaig, supra note
261 (asserting that many shipowners have complied with OPA standards-making ships
safer in international waters as well as U.S. waters); New PIPRNC Report, supra note 265
(noting that since 1990 more than half of orders for building new tankers have been for
double hulls).
267. See Smith, supra note 54, at 150 (asserting that OPA's requirement of double
hulls not only helps to prevent unnecessary spills, but also serves as example for interna-
tional oil indutry); Donaldson, supra note 165, at 319 (noting that Marine Environment
Protection Committee agreed to accept safer alternative designs for ships).
268. See G6ransson, supra note 84, at 82 (describing U.S. role in 1984 Protocols
and U.S. failure to ratify as influential in 1992 Protocols).
269. See Smith, supra note 54, at 150 (asserting that CLC, although is harmed in
some ways by U.S. refusal to join, could ultimately benefit from it).
270. SeeYost, supra note 158, at 330 (noting that as many as 32 different states have
implemented independent laws, creating possibility of reversion to pre-1990 confu-
sion); see also Kopec & Peterson, supra note 141, at 626 (arguing that only result of
stringent state liability limits is to divert traffic to states with lower limits and defeat
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by maintaining states rights, OPA isolates the United States from
the international community and fails to create a uniform stan-
dard on which carriers and producers can depend.27' One critic
remarked that the result is a contradictory system and delay in
clean-up operations and in the settlement of claims.272 Authors
also assert that OPA could have dealt with coastal states' rights
within this act or under a different federal scheme.2 73
Critics note that while OPA's provisions for unlimited liabil-
ity could be beneficial, oil companies have found loopholes in
the system to avoid the possibility of losing all of their assets.274
When OPA was first enacted, major shipowners reacted by an-
nouncing that they would use only chartered vessels to carry oil
into the United States and refused to enter certain ports. 75
Some authors assert that smaller, one-vessel companies, contin-
ued to bring oil into the United States because liability for a spill
would only result in the loss of the single vessel.2 76 This provi-
sion may allow unlimited liability to become limited to an
initial purpose of OPA); Kende, supra note 54, at 147 (calling OPA disappointment
both domestically and internationally because of failure to pre-empt state law and fail-
ure to adopt CLC).
271. SeeWilkinson et al., supra note 107, at 203 (describing double layer of liability
as area of potential confusion); see also Kopec & Peterson, supra note 141, at 599 (com-
menting that Congress failed to set forth comprehensive uniform law as it had planned
to do).
272. See CHso, supra note 18, at 261 (stating that non-preemption calls validity of
OPA into question).
273. See Randle, supra note 168 at 10119 (referring to OPA regional provisions
pertinent to Prince William Sound); Kopec & Peterson, supra note 141, at 629 (noting
that Congress has dealt with geographical areas with special needs in Pipeline Act, and
OPA provisions for North Carolina and Alaska).
274. See CHAo, supra note 18, at 273 (noting that in order to meet requirement,
freight rates will increase and insurance premiums will rise; burden will ultimately fall
on U.S. consumer); see also Kopec & Peterson, supra note 141, at 626 (arguing that large
companies with many assets will be unable to obtain adequate insurance).
275. See Shell Halts Call supra note 256 (describing Shell's boycott of ships in U.S.
waters); Elf To Follow Shell in US Port Boycott, LLoYDs Lsr, June 22, 1990; see also Morgan,
supra note 253, at 6 (predicting that, having little to lose, tanker owners without re-
sources to cover cleanup costs or satisfy damage claims would be attracted to U.S. wa-
ters).
276. See CHiAo, supra note 18, at 272 (remarking that result is cyclical pattern,
where single-shipped companies will not be as diligent in preventing pollution as larger
companies with more to lose would be). Because smaller companies will be less con-
cerned with the environment, the ultimate result could be more consequential, actually
raising the risk of accidents. Id.; Shell Halts Cal4 supra note 256 (describing lack of
money of single ship companies). But see Kopec & Peterson, supra note 141, at 627
(arguing that OPA requirement of showing evidence of financial responsibility to satisfy
financial liability may prevent smaller ships from entering).
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amount determined by oil transport companies.277
Some authors argue that OPA is insufficient, allowing ship-
owners from other nations to avoid liability because it only ap-
plies to those shipowners subject to U.S. jurisdiction.2 78 To the
contrary, the CLC specifically provides for international recogni-
tion ofjurisdiction over all member nation's tankers. 9 If ship-
owners from other nations are allowed to escape liability, then
the aggrieved parties will not be compensated at all. 8 °
III. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD JOIN THE CONVENTION
ON CIVIL IABILITY
U.S. treatment of oil spills, since OPA's enactment, demon-
strates the inadequacy of the current liability scheme.28 ' While
OPA improved existing laws, it failed to provide the most effi-
cient solution to the problem of liability for a major maritime oil
spill. To attain the most adequate level of compensation for
spills and to insure recovery from shipowners from other na-
tions, the United States should become a member of the CLC.
A. International Reasons
Oil transport is an international industry. Many countries
depend on maritime oil transportation to meet their oil de-
277. See CHAo, supra note 18, at 272 (noting that result is that larger shipowners
retreat to form single ship companies).
278. See Smith, supra note 54, at 143 (remarking that many tanker owners from
other countries do not have attachable property in United States and even if shipowner
agrees to jurisdiction, problem then lies in enforcement in courts of other nations); see
also CsHo, supra note 18, at 273 (asserting that claimants may not obtainjudgment even
if they know responsible party).
279. CLC, supra note 12. Article X(1) states:
Anyjudgment given by a court with jurisdiction in accordance with Article IX
which is enforceable in the state of origin where it is no longer subject to
ordinary forms of review, shall be recognized in any Contracting State, except:
(a) where the judgment was obtained by fraud; or
(b) where the defendant was not given reasonable notice and a fair opportu-
nity to present his case.
Id.
280. See CHAo, supra note 18, at 273 (arguing that one consequence of OPA may
be no compensation); see also Smith, supra note 54, at 32 (asserting that United States
would have problem in enforcing judgments in foreign courts).
281. See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text (describing grounding of New
Carissa off coast of Oregon and problems with funding cleanup).
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mands.282 Since numerous countries are involved in oil trans-
port, a unified scheme of determining liability in the case of a
spill is necessary. When large amounts of oil are transported
across oceans, it is possible, and in fact probable, that some of
this oil will be spilled. Because spills can affect more than one
nation, an international system of apportioning liability is neces-
sary.28 3 Byjoining the CLC, the United States will move towards
minimizing environmental damage caused by spills and maxi-
284mizing compensation.
The CLG is international in scope and allows for greater
spill prevention and broader compensation than OPA.285 The
CLC joins many nations together in pursuit of common goals:
minimizing damage and compensating for clean-up.286 By form-
ing a fund that is available to all member nations and regulations
that are applicable in all member nations, the CLC allows for
recovery that is greater in amount and more accessible to claim-
ants.
B. Better Mechanism
While the CLC is not perfect, it is a uniform law, providing
shipowners with a consistent set of rules, regardless of their loca-
tion. On the contrary, OPA allows for individual states to set
their own liability laws.28 7 Non-preemption has proven confus-
ing to shipowners and has resulted in non-compliance. By join-
ing the CLC, the United States will encourage shipowners to
follow a uniform set of guidelines. Instead of searching for loop-
holes to circumvent the rules, shipowners will likely work to-
gether in an attempt to conform. If the United States is a party
to the CLC, then major shipping nations will comply with CLC
282. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (accounting current oil con-
sumption rate and where oil originates and where it is consumed).
283. See supra notes 237-39 (concluding that oil spills are international because the
resulting damages affect more than one country).
284. See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text (describing limits of OPA and
greater possibility of recovery under CLC).
285. See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text (explaining that international
schemes are inherently broader because of involvement of more nations and subse-
quently more money).
286. See supra notes 122-31 and accompanying text (describing initial goals of
CLC).
287. See supra notes 270-73 and accompanying text (describing individual state laws
regarding oil spills).
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guidelines because there will be no uncertainty as to what the
steadfast rules are.2 88
The CLC provides more expansive remedies for U.S. claim-
ants than are currently available under OPA. With current liabil-
ity law, shipowners without property that is attachable under
U.S. jurisdiction may be judgment-proof. 2 9 Under the CLC,
however, if a shipowner spills oil in U.S. waters without assets
subject to U.S. jurisdiction, then injured parties will still be able
to recover. 2 ° This provision greatly broadens the possibility of
rapid compensation to parties injured by a spill. By joining the
CLC, the United States will also forego problems with enforce-
ment of U.S. judgments in other nations.29'
The CLC provides compensation to injured parties quickly
and then looks to the IOPC fund for reimbursement. This has
proven to be more efficient than OPA's approach to compensa-
tion because the spill is cleaned up quickly and environmental
damage is minimized. Even though all parties were not compen-
sated in the Braer spill, the CLC worked towards finding the best
solution possible while providing some money to fund the clean-
up so that the cost did not fall on the public.
By joining the CLC, the United States will alleviate the cost
to the U.S. taxpayer when a spill occurs. Under the current do-
mestic regime, money available for clean-up is limited; the excess
costs frequently fall on the public, and is often not reim-
bursed.29 2 The CLC efficiently spreads the cost of clean-up
among the numerous member nations. By taxing barrels of oil,
the IOPC also provides for some contribution from shipowners
and cargo owners, thereby holding them to some level of respon-
sibility for the spill.
The United States is a source of guidance for many smaller
nations in determining which international conventions to join.
288. See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text (describing oil transport as in-
ternational industry and U.S. role in that industry).
289. See supra notes 278-80 and accompanying text (describing OPA provision that
limits scope to U.S. jurisdiction).
290. See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text (describing greater possibility
of recovery under OPA because all shipowners assets that are in any member nation can
be taken).
291. See supra notes 240-42 (providing thatjudgments are more likely to be carried
out under CLO because numerous nations are members).
292. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text (describing New Carissa spin and
public spending without reimbursement).
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If the United States becomes a member of the CLC then other
nations would be encouraged to join. The result would be a
truly unified system for determining liability for maritime oil
spills.2 93
CONCLUSION
The U.S. refusal to join the CLC has forced parties injured
by maritime oil spills to fund the clean-up themselves. OPA is
inadequate in providing relief to aggrieved parties. OPA is con-
fusing to shipowners because it applies different standards in dif-
ferent areas. Before another large spill occurs, the United States
must reformulate its current oil spill liability law. In order to
provide a uniform scheme upon which both shipowners and in-
jured parties can rely, the United States must become a member
of the CLC.
293. See supra note 247 and accompanying text (describing U.S. influential role in
international legislation).
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